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Racial Distancing in a Southern City: Latino Immigrants' Views of Black Americans

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This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 14-18, 2004. The survey reported in this paper was funded by a grant from The Ford Foundation (St. Benedict the Black Meets the Virgin of Guadalupe Project, Grant #1025-1445). We thank The Foundation and Dr. Melvin Oliver, former Vice President of Asset Building and Community Development, now Dean of Social Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, for their support of our research. We would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers whose comments pushed us to think more critically about this important topic. We are very appreciative of their efforts on our behalf.

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Forthcoming *Journal of Politics* (August 2006)

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## Abstract

The United States is undergoing dramatic demographic change, primarily from immigration, and many of the new Latino immigrants are settling in the South. This paper examines hypotheses related to attitudes of Latino immigrants toward black Americans in a Southern city. The analyses are based on a survey of black, white and Latino residents (n=500). The results show, for the most part, Latino immigrants hold negative stereotypical views of blacks and feel that they have more in common with whites than with blacks. Yet, whites do not reciprocate in their feelings toward Latinos. Latinos' negative attitudes toward blacks, however, are modulated by a sense of linked fate with other Latinos. This research is important because the South still contains the largest population of African Americans in the United States and no section of the country has been more rigidly defined along a black-white racial divide. How these new Latino immigrants situate themselves vis-à-vis black Americans has profound implications for the social and political fabric of the South.

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The 2000 Census confirmed what many Americans already suspected--dramatic demographic change was underway in the United States. The country was becoming increasingly more racially and ethnically diverse with Latinos being one of the fastest growing racial and ethnic groups. The U. S. Census Bureau estimates by 2050, non-Hispanic whites will be only 50.1 percent of the population, while Latinos will be close to one-quarter of the population (U. S. Census Bureau 2004). Some of the demographic changes are attributed to increasing Latino immigration into the United States, with areas of the South experiencing some of the most dramatic demographic change.<sup>1</sup> A number of Southern states, such as North Carolina, Alabama, and Georgia, reported substantial increases in the size of their Latino populations from 1990 to 2000 (U. S. Census 1990, 2000). Notwithstanding, far less attention has been paid to the changing demographics in the South, as this region has not been the recipient of large numbers of Latino immigrants in the past.

Latinos, by and large, are an entirely new population in the South. Unlike other regions of the country, the South, for the most part, has had no experience with immigrant populations of Latin American origin. The large-scale settlement of Latinos in the Deep South is no more than 10-15 years old (Durand, Massey, and Carvet 2000). Most of these Southern areas are what Suro and Singer (2002) refer to as, "New Latino Destinations" (Hernández-León and Zuñiga

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<sup>1</sup>The U. S. Census Bureau estimates that 53 percent of the growth in the Latino population is the result of immigration.

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2005). Areas with increasing sizes of Latino populations include cities such as Atlanta, GA; Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston Salem, and Raleigh-Durham, NC; Nashville and Memphis, TN; and Greenville, SC, among others. Between 1990 and 2000, the Atlanta MSA experienced a 388 percent increase in Latino population (55,045 to 268,851 comprising 7 percent of the MSA population); Charlotte, Greensboro-Winston Salem, and Raleigh-Durham MSAs saw the Latino population increase 685 percent (9,817 to 77,092 for 5 percent of MSA), 809 percent (6,844 to 62,210 for 5 percent of MSA) and 631 percent (9,923 to 72,580 for 6 percent of MSA) respectively; Nashville and Memphis MSAs have seen a 454 percent (7,250 to 40,139 for 3 percent of MSA) and 265 percent (7,546 to 27,520 for 2 percent of MSA) increase respectively in their Latino populations; and the Greenville MSA underwent a 358 percent (5,712 to 26,167 for 3 percent of MSA) increase over the decade (Suro and Singer 2002:12-13).

What accounts for this increased Latino immigration into the South? The limited research suggests several reasons. Major shifts in the global economy and new trade policies, such as the 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), encouraged the migration of labor and capital restructuring regional, national and global economies. Older industries in the South, such as agriculture, steel, textiles, furniture, and clothing were damaged by the new economy, which included foreign-owned auto plants, high-tech research and manufacturing, biomedical research, and new food processing plants for poultry, hogs, and seafood (Griffith 1993). From the late 1970s to the early 1990s, the economy of the South outperformed all other regions of the country resulting in a need for large numbers of unskilled and inexpensive labor (Duchon and Murphy 2001: 1; Kandel and Parrado 2004). In order to fill this expanded labor

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need of unskilled low-wage workers, these industries began to actively recruit immigrant workers from Mexico and Central America, but primarily from Mexico (Torres 2000).

Coupled with the pull of economic changes in the South was the push of the ongoing economic crisis in Mexico. This continuing crisis pushed many legal as well as undocumented immigrants into the Southern part of the United States (Massey, Durand and Malone 2002). Many of these Latino immigrants have settled in southern towns and rural areas, but large numbers have chosen urban areas as well. Those who settle in urban areas tend to be employed in non-union, low-wage jobs, such as service workers, cleaning hotels, working for other types of cleaning companies, construction and landscaping firms, and building maintenance (Massey, Durand and Malone 2002).

The new Latino immigrants are entering a region where race has defined the context, structure and life chances of black and white Southerners for centuries. As V. O. Key highlighted in *Southern Politics* (1949), the politics of the South is the politics of race. While much has changed since Key's book was published more than a half-century ago, few would argue that race has ceased to be a salient factor in the political and social fabric of the region. What effect is this demographic shift going to have on the structure of intergroup relations in the South that has historically been entirely based on the relationship between blacks and whites? Relations between the new Latino immigrants and established Southern black communities have the potential to be fraught with conflict. But it is also possible these two groups will see each other as having lots in common as racial minorities in a Southern environment. How these new immigrants relate to the established black and white populations is of critical importance in analyzing how they will adapt to the region and how these established populations will adapt to

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them. Drawing on data from a study of a Southern city that is undergoing tremendous demographic changes, the findings in this paper suggest that relations between black Americans and Latino immigrants are likely to be one of conflict rather than a joining together based on shared minority status in the South.

### **Two Historical Cases of Racial Distancing**

Given the recent nature of Latino immigration into the South, it is not surprising that little scholarly attention has been paid to the topic, although some research is beginning to emerge (Murphy, Blanchard, and Hill 2001; Mohl 2003; Ciscel, Smith and Mendoza 2003; Torres 2000; Kandel and Parrado 2004; Cobb and Stueck 2005; Peacock, Watson and Matthews 2005). The exception in the literature has been research on Miami and the effect of the influx of post-1959 Cubans. Before Miami, however, there was a prior historical instance of the introduction of a new foreign population into the black-white dynamic of the South--the Chinese in Mississippi. Their introduction was probably one of the first moments in post-Civil War United States history where the black-white biracial paradigm was confronted in any real way. The reaction of both of these new immigrants to black Americans might give us a sense of how the new Latino immigrants will react to and position themselves in relation to the Southern black American population. Both Chinese immigrants to the South during the late-nineteenth century and Cuban immigrants during the mid-twentieth century pursued a strategy of racial distancing, seeing themselves as being in economic and social competition with black Americans rather than as natural allies in the fight for social and political equality.

The Chinese entered Southern history during Reconstruction as part of a strategy devised by Southern planters to retain political power and economic control over the newly freed blacks (Loewen, 1971; Quan, 1982). The planters' strategy was the importation and employment of Chinese men in occupations previously held by blacks (Quan, 1982: 5). From the planters' perspective the Chinese were ideal. On the one hand, they would take jobs from blacks forcing them into a subordinate position, while on the other, they were barred from citizenship, could not vote, and thus would not present a potential political threat (Loewen, 1971: 22). This attempt, however, was an utter failure, and by 1880 there were only 51 Chinese inhabitants of the Mississippi Delta (Loewen (1971: 25).<sup>2</sup> These numbers increased, however, as Chinese men brought over Chinese brides.

The Chinese were immediately confronted with the South's racial hierarchy where they were classified with blacks and subject to some of the same segregation laws (Loewen, 1971: 23-4). Despite the cordial relations Chinese apparently shared initially with blacks, they forcefully resisted their social and legal designation with blacks. In fact, Mississippi Chinese filed one of the earliest legal challenges to school segregation in the United States in 1924.<sup>3</sup> Historians agree that the Chinese actively sought white approval and, sought to distance themselves from blacks (Loewen, 1971; Quan, 1982). Moreover, to insure their middle position between whites

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<sup>2</sup> According to the 2000 Census, there are 3,099 Chinese in MS presently, and a total Asian population, including East Indians, of 18,626. The most plentiful group is Vietnamese.

<sup>3</sup>The Mississippi Constitution of 1890, as cited by Loewen (1971:67) and Quan (1982:45), stated that "separate schools shall be maintained for children of the white and colored races, and because the Chinese were not of the White race they were considered of the colored races." In the case brought by Gong Lum, a grocer in Rosedale and a U.S. citizen (*Gong Lum v. Rice*. 1927. 275 U.S. 390), the Supreme Court upheld the Mississippi Supreme Courts decision upholding segregation of Chinese with blacks.

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and blacks, the Chinese told whites that they were not interested in marrying whites and were definitely not interested in marrying blacks (Loewen, 1971: 79). They were successful in convincing whites that they were more like whites than they were blacks (whitening up), and they shared whites' negative attitudes toward and approved of their treatment of blacks.

During the Civil Rights Movement (CRM), relations between blacks and Chinese were strained even further. Blacks knew the Chinese community favored whites, and the CRM served to make that choice more obvious. In 1970, when school desegregation came to Mississippi, both whites and Chinese enrolled their children in private academies (Loewen, 1971: 177). The Delta Chinese saw the CRM as threatening the system of racial segregation that enabled them to occupy a middling space in the oppressive Mississippi environment (Loewen, 1971; Quan, 1982). In brief, in order to attain a certain degree of social standing, the Mississippi Chinese had to actively distance themselves from blacks to show whites that they had no sympathy with blacks and their plight. As such, the Mississippi Chinese began to see themselves as having more in common with whites than with blacks and acted on that perceived commonality.

### Cubans in Miami

Miami is probably the best-known instance of the introduction of substantial numbers of a foreign population into the South, but it did not occur en masse until 1959. The number of Cubans in the Miami area in the 1950s was small. The estimate is only about 4 percent (19,800) of Miami's 495,000 population were Spanish-language speakers in 1950, and about 70 percent of that number (13,860) were estimated to be Cuban (Clark 1991). The push for the immigration of massive numbers of Cubans was the Cuban Revolution in 1959, while the pull to the United States was the needs of United States Cold War foreign policy. The Cubans began to

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arrive in Miami in 1959 just as the black Civil Rights Movement was getting underway and was creating opportunities for blacks across the nation. The arrival, to a large extent, of over 800,000 Cubans in Miami between 1959 and 1980 short-circuited economic and political gains for black Miamians (Mohl 1990a).

Cubans were not the normal labor immigrant case. Most of the 1959 immigrants were from the professional class in Cuba. While they initially worked in low-paying jobs that blacks had occupied, the United States government moved quickly to assist them as part of its strategy to undermine Fidel Castro in Cuba. Programs were developed that provided Cubans with food and clothing, housing assistance, social services, medical care, relocation assistance, educational programs, job training, and job placement. As a result, thousands of Cuban elites were able to resume their professional lives in South Florida. It has been estimated that between 1960 and 1990, approximately \$2 billion was spent on Cuban resettlement activities (Mohl 1990a).

Massive federal financial assistance to the new Cuban immigrants was not lost on Miami's black population, who were not able to participate in the programs established for the Cuban immigrants. As early as 1960, the Miami black press began to view the Cuban influx as detrimental to black aspirations and achievements. Blacks and Cubans began to compete for housing and residential space, jobs, and government services (Mohl 1990a). The significant amount of federal resources going to Cubans significantly shifted the economic landscape; in the 20 years of Cuban immigration to Dade County, black entrepreneurship steadily declined. From 1968 to 1980, Cubans received 46.6 percent of all Small Business Administration (SBA) loans in Dade County compared to only 6 percent to blacks. After the four riots in the 1980s, the

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situation worsened with 90 percent of SBA loans in Miami-Dade going to Cubans and whites  
(Grenier and Castro 2001).

Like the Mississippi Chinese, Cubans in Miami also perceived a benefit to distancing themselves from black Americans. The substantial assistance from and special status given the Cubans by the United States government put them in a privileged position vis-à-vis black Americans. Cubans, most of whom in the first post-1959 wave self-identified as white, perceived that they had little in common with blacks and situated themselves alongside whites. Moreover, the racial stratification and racial history in Cuba was similar to that of the United States. Blacks arrived in Cuba as slaves, and the post-slavery color hierarchy was one in which most of the social, economic, and political benefits went to those of lighter complexion, while those Cubans of African ancestry and darker skin were relegated to the bottom rungs of society. Segregation along with racial discrimination was prominent in pre-1959 Cuba (Scott 1985; De la Fuente, 1995, 1998; Guimaraes 2001). Race was an old problem in Cuba with its origins in slavery and colonization, and the post-1959 white Cubans brought those attitudes with them to the United States.

### **Theoretical Implications**

In both the Mississippi and Miami cases, a system of racial hierarchy and segregation allowed both communities to flourish. In the Mississippi case, the Chinese flourished despite their status as a non-favored group, whereas with the Cubans in Miami, their success was predetermined given the conditions under which they entered the United States and the massive federal government assistance. If the patterns observed in these two historical cases are predictive, it suggests that the new Latino immigrants into the South will distance themselves

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from Southern blacks. Recent literature underscores the presence of this historical pattern. In a study of black and Latino relations in Houston, TX in the 1990s, Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2003) found that US-born Latinos expressed more negative views of black Americans than blacks expressed of Latinos, but foreign-born Latinos held even more negative views of black Americans. Moreover, foreign-born Latinos were the least tolerant of blacks.

It is possible that attitudes about blacks present in their home countries make Latino immigrants more likely to see black Americans negatively and want to distance themselves from blacks. A large literature exists on racial hierarchy, racial prejudice and discrimination, and racial stereotypes in Latin America, the Caribbean, and Mexico (de la Cadena 2001; Wade 1993, 1997; de la Fuente 2001; Gimareas 2001; Winant 1992; Geipel 1997; Hanchard 1994; Mörner 1967; Sweet 1997; Dulitzky 2005). Literature specifically on the racial ordering in Mexico argues that race became a principal factor in the social and economic organization of Spanish colonial society and the racial ordering was established to benefit whites (Menchaca 2001; Seed 1982). Despite the negative attitudes toward blacks on the part of Latino immigrants identified by Mindiola, Niemann, and Rodriguez (2003), it is possible that increased contact between the two groups will reduce Latino immigrants' negative attitudes toward black Americans. One approach to thinking about this response is through the lens of contact theory.

### **Contact Theory**

Contact theory (or propinquity) is the springboard for much of the literature on racial attitudes. It argues that increased contact between two groups with negative attitudes toward each other will result in a decrease in negative attitudes (Hood and Morris 1998). Originally associated with the work of Allport (1954), research on contextual determinants of racial and

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ethnic relations has been mixed. Some scholars have found increased contact under certain conditions, e.g., interdependence, common goals, equal status, and encouragement by authorities, reduces prejudice (Amir 1969, 1976; Jackman and Crane 1986; Stephan and Stephan 1985; Kinder and Mendelberg 1995; Ellison and Powers 1994; Welch, Sigelman, Bledsoe and Combs 2001; Sigelman and Welch 1993). Other researchers have found that as the concentration, and consequently contact, of two groups increases, competition and prejudice also increase (Fossett and Kiecolt 1989; Quillian 1996). Still others have identified the presence of both increased animosity and reduced prejudice (Morris 1999; Sigelman and Welch 1993).

Most of this research, however, has focused on black and white interaction, and a few studies have focused on Latino and Asian interaction with whites (Taylor 1998). Research on the effects of interminority group contact on prejudice and stereotypes is limited. Oliver and Wong (2003) examined attitudes of racial groups in multi-racial settings finding, with the exception of Asians, people who live in neighborhoods where their group dominates tend to harbor greater negative stereotypes about other racial minority groups. In other words, racial stereotypes increase as the percent of one's own in-group increases in their neighborhood. Blacks and Latinos, who are the most racially isolated, harbor the most negative views of other groups, but this pattern was not as pronounced among blacks and Latinos residing in neighborhoods that are racially diverse. Yet, they also found that higher levels of propinquity correlated with lower levels of prejudice and perceived competition (Oliver and Wong 2003). Thus, it appears that contact theory can result in three different types of reactions—reduced prejudice and perceived competition, increased prejudice and perceived competition, or a mixture of both.

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Drawing from the cases of Miami and Mississippi, the literature on Latino immigrant attitudes toward black Americans and contact theory, we test two hypotheses:

H<sub>1</sub> Latino immigrants hold negative stereotypes of black Americans, but these stereotypes will be reduced by length of stay in the country, and increased interaction with black Americans; and

H<sub>2</sub> Latino immigrants see themselves as closer to whites than to blacks, but increases in length of time in the country, and increased interaction with black Americas will push them closer to blacks.

### **Research Setting**

Durham, North Carolina is the setting for this study. The City of Durham, like many Southern locations, is undergoing demographic change. Table 1 shows the changes in the demographics of the population of the City of Durham from 1990 to 2000. What is clear is that the number of Latinos residing in the city has risen dramatically. In 1990, Latinos were slightly more than one percent of the population, but by 2000, their percentage reached 8.6 percent. For decades, whites were the majority in Durham (51.6% in 1990), but the increasing Latino population, along with a smaller increase in the Asian population, have reduced the white proportion to the point where in 2000 blacks and whites were almost equal percentages of the population, 45.5 percent for whites and 43.8 percent for blacks.<sup>4</sup>

[Insert Table 1 about here]

Durham's Latino population is antithetical to the Cuban case. First, the current wave of Latino immigrants does not fit into the United States' foreign policy calculations of encouraging

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an exodus from a communist country in an effort to undermine the government. Thus, the enormous amounts of federal aid that went to post-1959 Cubans in South Florida do not exist for these new Latino immigrants. Although Latinos in Durham are not benefiting from targeted social services as in Miami, it does appear there are special programs designed to help native Spanish speakers receive more traditional forms of aid. Second, Latinos in Durham are typically not members of the professional community in their home countries, and have lower incomes and education and skill levels than the Cuban community. Many of these immigrants are from poorer countries, e.g. Mexico, and Central America.<sup>5</sup> Therefore, Latinos and blacks might come into greater competition for the same jobs and social services than in Miami (for a discussion of possible job competition, see McClain et al 2005). Third, the reasons for immigration into the United States for recent immigrants are primarily economic rather than political.<sup>6</sup>

Why Durham, North Carolina? First, North Carolina has the fastest growing Latino population in the country. It experienced an almost 500 percent increase in its Latino population, primarily with immigrants from Mexico, skyrocketing from 76,726 in 1990 to 378,963 in 2000 (U. S. Census 1990, 2000). Furthermore, North Carolina had the highest rate of growth in its immigrant population out of all the states in the 1990s. Suro and Singer (2002)

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<sup>4</sup> Both of these groups gained in absolute numbers of people, but lost as a proportion of the population from 1990 to 2000.

<sup>5</sup>The *News and Observer* (Raleigh, NC) identified that many of the Mexican immigrants into North Carolina come primarily from rural towns in the State of Puebla (November 29, 1998; November 30, 1998). For the most part, these immigrants are unskilled and poorly educated.

<sup>6</sup>In a series of articles throughout 2002 chronicling the lives of area residents living in poverty, *The Herald Sun* (Durham) provided a picture of life for Latinos in Durham that differed markedly from the Miami case. Fully 26 percent of the more than 16,000 Latinos in Durham live below the federal poverty level, and, in order to make a good living, it is necessary for them to work more than one job (Assis and Pecquet 2002: A12).

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identify Raleigh-Durham as having the highest rate of Latino growth from 1980 to 2000—1,180 percent. [See figures in Table 1.] Second, Durham, like other cities of the New South, has experienced a decline or exit of industries where blacks have traditionally found work. As a result, a substantial portion of the black population now works in the service industry and many (but not necessarily all) blacks and the new Latino immigrants find themselves competing for the same jobs. Finally, from a research and data gathering perspective, Durham is of a manageable size.

### **Data and Measures**

The analyses in this paper are based on The 2003 Durham Survey of Intergroup Relations (DSIR) (n=500). The survey was conducted specifically for our project by the Center for Survey Research of the University of Virginia using a Computer-Aided Telephone Interviewing (CATI) system, employing random digit dialing (RDD) and dialing of directory-assisted Hispanic surname sample.<sup>7</sup> A randomly generated sample of phone numbers based on exchanges valid in the Durham, North Carolina area was called. An over-sample of numbers listed in the phone directory under a Hispanic surname was called at the same time.<sup>8</sup> The survey was conducted from May 4 through June 22, 2003 and interviews were conducted in both English and Spanish (32 percent of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, which translates into 95.8 percent of

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<sup>7</sup>We recognize the problems associated with drawing a sample from a listing of Hispanic surnames, for example, missing Hispanics with non-Hispanic last names, and those married to non-Hispanics. We also acknowledge that some Latino immigrants might not have phones in their homes. Given the recency of the Hispanic population in Durham and the high proportion of immigrants, however, we choose the sampling frame that would give us the highest probabilities of getting to a Latino respondent.

<sup>8</sup>Both samples were purchased from Survey Sampling, Inc. (SSI) of Fairfield, CT.

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the Latino sample opting to be interviewed in Spanish).<sup>9</sup> A race/ethnicity quota was implemented to achieve a minimum of 150 whites, 150 blacks, and 150 Latinos; the remaining 50 respondents were not under this quota restriction and represent a number of racial/ethnic backgrounds. Interviews were completed with 500 residents of the City of Durham for an overall response rate of 21.6 percent.<sup>10</sup> The sample of 500 consists of 160 whites (32 percent), 151 blacks (30 percent), 167 Latinos (34 percent), 6 Asians (1.2 percent), 12 who designated their race as Other (2.4%), and 1 respondent (0.2 percent) who did not indicate a racial category.<sup>11</sup>

To assess the quality of the sample, we compared the distribution of demographic characteristics in our study with the characteristics of the population in Durham as reported in the 2000 Census. Since the study was designed to over-sample the black and Latino populations, we did a detailed analysis of the extent to which each of our three main subpopulation samples

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<sup>9</sup>We had the questionnaire translated by a Spanish-language organization in Chapel Hill, NC. In order to check the translation and to ensure that it tracked the English-language version, the survey organization drew a small sample of Latinos in Durham for the sole purpose of checking the translation. As a result, changes were made to the translation. The revised Spanish-language version was then pretested on another small sample of Latinos in Durham.

<sup>10</sup>A total of 4208 phone numbers were attempted in the course of the survey and a total of 14,014 call attempts were made. The American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) rate was calculated using the full call history of each number that was recorded automatically by the CATI software. The response rate was calculated according to AAPOR suggested formula RR3, with  $e1 = .50$  and  $e2 = .78$ . We estimated  $e1$  and  $e2$  based on an analysis of residency rates and the occurrence of out-of-area households in our sample. Partial interviews are not counted in the numerator of the RR3 formula.

<sup>11</sup>Due to the use of the Hispanic surname sample and racial/ethnic quotas, sampling error is more difficult to calculate. The sample may be viewed as part of two separate populations. Within the RDD sample, the source of 276 completions, the probability of selection is known and the margin of error is  $\pm 5.9$  percent. Within the surname oversample, providing 244 completed interviews, all households listed under a resident with a Hispanic surname were attempted; however, Hispanics were included in RDD calling and non-Hispanics were included in the oversample. Non-Hispanics with Hispanic surnames had a greater chance of selection than non-Hispanics in the RDD sample who do not have Hispanic surnames. If we assume this to be a more or less random occurrence, then the margin of error for each of the three-racial/ethnic groups is roughly 8 percent.

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are represented in our sample, the results of which are not presented here.<sup>12</sup> In brief, overall, we find that our sample is reasonably representative of the three racial sub-populations under investigation, though the distribution of respondents is slightly older, better educated, and more often female than found in the 2000 Census.

Our data also confirm what we had suspected--the Latino population in Durham is basically an immigrant population, primarily from Mexico. Ninety-three percent of the Latino respondents in the sample were born outside the United States. Of the 93 percent (n=156), only about 19 percent were naturalized citizens. While Mexicans were the largest portion of the Latino sample (63 percent), Latinos from Central America were the next largest group (23 percent), followed by South American (5 percent), Puerto Rican (4 percent), Spanish (2 percent), Cuban (1 percent), and Other Latino (2 percent). Given that we are interested in Latino immigrant attitudes, most of the analyses are performed using only these 156 individuals.

We use two dependent variables in our analyses to test our hypotheses. One dependent variable--Latino stereotypical views of blacks--is an index of three stereotype questions ranging in value from 3 (holding the least stereotypical views of blacks) to 15 (holding the most stereotypical views of blacks).<sup>13</sup> A second dependent variable measures which racial group (Asians, blacks, or whites) Latinos felt they have the most in common with (1=have most in

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<sup>12</sup>A copy of the full analysis is available from the lead author.

<sup>13</sup>Question wording: Q1) For blacks, do you think “work hard” describes: almost all blacks, most blacks, some blacks, few blacks, almost no blacks; Q2) For blacks, do think “it is easy to get along with them” describes: (same response categories as question 1); Q3) For blacks, do think “you can trust them” describes: (same response categories as question 1). We recognize that these three questions are the bluntest measures of stereotypes and other more subtle measures of stereotypes exist, but had to make difficult choices when we had to cut the questionnaire in half in order to stay within budget. As such, we decided on measuring the most negative stereotypes.

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common with whites; 0=have most in common with blacks).<sup>14</sup> We use the following predictor variables, although not all are included in every equation: education attainment measured as number of years of schooling (ranging from 0 to 25 years)<sup>15</sup>; perception of number of blacks (Latinos) in their neighborhood<sup>16</sup>; social contact with blacks (Latinos)<sup>17</sup>; length of time in the United States as measured by a question that asked immigrant respondents the year that they arrived<sup>18</sup>(ranges from 0 to 35 years; mean= 8.75 years; median= 6 years)<sup>19</sup>, and gender (1=male; 0=female). We do not include contact with blacks at work as one of the contact indicators because of substantial missing data. Educational attainment and gender are used as demographic controls.

We also include the indicator of linked fate (those believing that what happens to other blacks (Latinos) will have something to do with their lives)<sup>20</sup> for several reasons. The concept of

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<sup>14</sup>Question wording for Latinos: 1) Of the following groups, if you had to say, which one do you feel you have the most in common with: African Americans/blacks, Asians, or whites; 2) And, which of the following groups do you feel you share the least in common with: African Americans/blacks, Asians, or whites. We recoded the Asian category as missing, since only six Latino respondents reported feeling that Latinos have the most in common with Asians. Coding for the dependent variable is 1 (have most in common with whites) and 0 (have most in common with blacks).

<sup>15</sup>Income had initially been included in our model but was dropped due to suspected collinearity with education.

<sup>16</sup>Question wording: In your neighborhood, how many of the residents are black (Latinos)? 1) none of the residents; 2) a few of the residents; 3) some of the residents; 4) most of the residents; 5) all of the residents.

<sup>17</sup>Question wording: In your social life, including your friends and people you know from church and other social activities, do you have 4) a lot of contact, 3) some contact, 2) little contact, or 1) no contact at all, with blacks (Latinos)?

<sup>18</sup>We converted this measure to years in the United States by subtracting the year arrived from 2003 (the year the survey was conducted)

<sup>19</sup>Although our sample is of Latino immigrants, some of whom are new arrivals, the mean (8.75 years) and median (6 years) of this predictor suggest substantial variance, and, is thus an adequate measure of length of time in country.

<sup>20</sup>Question wording: Do you think what happens to Hispanics in this country will have something to do

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linked fate has been found to be a powerful predictor of group consciousness, political participation, and political attitudes among black Americans (Matthews and Prothro 1967; Shingles 1981; Dawson 1994; Tate 1993). The concept of linked fate, as Dawson (1994:76) suggests, evolves from social identity theory that suggests individuals form their concepts of self, in part, by identifying similarities and differences between themselves and others. Individuals perceive a similarity in experience and treatment, or perceive a linked fate with others (Davis and Brown 2002:241). Only a few studies have examined concepts similar to linked fate for Latinos. Kaufmann (2003) found that Latinos who feel close to one another as a group were much more likely to feel close to black Americans. In view of the significance of linked fate for black Americans, and the limited literature suggesting that feelings of closeness to other Latinos may influence Latino relations with black Americans, we want to see if Latino linked fate exists within Latino immigrant populations, and, if it does, what effects does it have on Latino immigrants' perceptions of black Americans. The data indicate two-thirds (67.91 percent) of Latino immigrants feel a sense of linked fate with other Latinos. This would suggest, at least as reflected in our survey, linked fate does exist among Latino immigrants. Latino linked fate is measured as 1=yes and 0=no.

Although we have not specified hypotheses for blacks, we examine similar equations for blacks in order to get a sense of the reciprocal nature of the relationship (n=151). Not all indicators used for Latinos, however, are appropriate to use for blacks, e.g., length of time in country, as approximately 95 percent of blacks are native-born. We use OLS and Logit regression analyses to test our hypotheses. We use Clarify, which makes it possible to compute

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with what happens in your life?

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predicted probabilities for values of the dependent variable while holding the predictor variables at their means or some other value, on several of the logit analyses (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).

### **Testing and Results**

Analyses for our first hypothesis indicates that the prevalence of negative stereotypes of black Americans in the Latino immigrant community is quite widespread, and seem especially so when compared to the prevalence of white stereotypes of blacks. Along each dimension, the stereotypes of blacks by Latinos are more negative than those of white respondents. (See Table A1 in the *JOP* online Appendix.) We found that 58.9 percent of the Latino immigrants in our study reported feeling that few or almost no blacks are hard working; approximately one-third (32.5 percent) of the Latino immigrant respondents reported feeling that few or almost no blacks are easy to get along with; and slightly more than a majority (56.9 percent) of the Latino immigrant respondents reported feeling that few or almost no blacks could be trusted. Among whites, the comparable figures are only 9.3 percent indicate that few or almost no blacks are hard working; only 8.4 percent believe that few or almost no blacks are easy to get along with; and only 9.6 percent feel that few or almost no blacks could be trusted. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, it does appear that many Latinos hold very negative stereotypes of blacks.

What factors influence the stereotypes that Latinos hold of black Americans? Table 2 presents the results of our OLS analysis. Even given the relatively small number of observations, almost all of our predictors are significant and in the hypothesized direction. To begin, the two demographic control variables, *education* and *male*, are both statistically significant. More

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educated Latinos have significantly less negative stereotypes, while men appear to have significantly more negative stereotypes (perhaps reflecting a predisposition of men to use more extreme values on survey instruments). More interesting, of course, are the influence of the remaining variables in the model. *Linked Fate* has a statistically significant and negative effect on unfavorable stereotypes of black Americans, which suggests that a sense of group identity with other Latinos is a robust corrective to negative stereotypes of blacks. Similarly, *length of time in the United States* has a negative, but in this case insignificant, effect on stereotypes of blacks. Consistent with earlier studies on the effects of contact among groups, our results are mixed. The amount of *social contact* also has a significant negative influence on Latinos' stereotypes of blacks, meaning more social contact predicts more positive attitudes toward blacks, yet, contrary to our expectations, the *number of blacks in the neighborhood* has a positive, but insignificant coefficient.<sup>21</sup> (These two indicators are not collinear in the zero-order case.) The explanation, perhaps, is that controlling for the ameliorating effects on negative stereotypes of social contact, having black neighbors may simply become a better marker for competition over housing, jobs and other resources, which could explain the greater prejudice of Latinos living in neighborhoods with more blacks.

[Table 2 about here]

One might think that the cause of Latinos' negative opinions about blacks is the transmission of prejudice from Southern whites, but our data do not support this notion. If you recall, white respondents report less negative stereotypes of blacks than do Latinos. To the extent that these responses are honestly communicated, then it seems unlikely that Latino prejudices are transmitted by whites. As we know, many racial attitudes are subject to social desirability

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<sup>21</sup>We reran the models including interaction terms of linked fate with neighborhood interaction with blacks, and education with neighborhood interaction with blacks, individually and in combination. None of the interaction

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effects, so the values of Southern whites reflected in our survey may not be an accurate reflection of what people really think. While not able to dismiss this notion entirely, it seems peculiar to us that whites would transmit negative stereotypes of blacks to other minorities in face-to-face interactions, especially when they would not give these opinions over the phone, which might indicate their discomfort at giving voice to these stereotypes. Second, a necessary condition for whites to communicate negative stereotypes to Latinos would seem to be that the longer Latinos were in the U.S. interacting with the country's white population, the more prejudiced they would have to become. We find in our multivariate analysis that Latinos who spend more time in the U.S. have less negative stereotypes of blacks (although the small sample size prevents us from claiming statistical significance), which would be inconsistent with a model based on the communication of values from Southern whites.

Alternatively, Latino prejudice toward blacks may be reciprocated prejudice. That is, perhaps Latinos' unfavorable opinions of blacks are to compensate in some way for prejudicial attitudes of blacks toward Latinos. Our data show that there is little support for this conjecture. (See bottom of Table A1 in the *JOP* online Appendix.) The overwhelming impression conveyed in the data is that blacks view Latinos much more favorably than Latinos view blacks. Almost three-fourths (71.9 percent) of blacks feel most or almost all Latinos are hardworking, two-fifths (42.8 percent) believe most or almost all Latinos are easy to get along with, and only one-third (32.6 percent) indicate almost no or few Latinos could be trusted. On the other hand, only 9.2 percent of Latinos feel that most or almost all blacks are hardworking, only 26.5 percent feel that most or almost all blacks are easy to get along with, and only 8 percent believe that most or almost all blacks can be trusted. It does not appear, therefore, that Latino prejudices are necessarily a result of hostility from Southern blacks.

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Although blacks hold fewer stereotypes of Latinos, stereotypes do exist, as evidenced by the percentages presented in the previous paragraph. The OLS results for the factors contributing to black stereotypes of Latinos are similar in ways to those for Latinos with several distinct and interesting differences. (The results are not shown here but can be found in Table A2 in the *JOP* online Appendix.) Blacks with higher levels of education hold fewer stereotypical views of Latinos, and, unlike Latino males, black men hold fewer stereotypes of Latinos than do black women. Although linked fate and social contact with Latinos are not statistically significant, they are both in the direction that we would have hypothesized. Blacks with linked fate and social contact with Latinos appear to hold fewer stereotypes of Latinos. Interestingly, just as in the Latino model, blacks with more neighborhood contact with Latinos appear to hold more negative stereotypes of Latinos than blacks with less neighborhood contact. This coefficient, however, is not statistically significant.

For our second hypothesis, we began by considering which racial group--Asians, blacks, or whites--Latino immigrants in our study reported feeling they have the most in common with and the least in common with. The data reveal that the overwhelming majority of our Latino immigrant respondents (78.3 percent) feel that they have the most in common with whites and the least in common with blacks (52.8 percent). Curiously, the relatively warm feelings toward whites and the coolness toward blacks among Latino respondents are not mutual. (See Table A3 in the *JOP* online Appendix.) The data show that while 45.9 percent of white respondents see themselves as having the most in common with blacks, just 22.2 percent of whites see themselves as having the most in common with Latinos. Similarly, a plurality of whites (47.5 percent) sees themselves as having the least in common with Latinos. Black respondents, on the other hand, do not generally feel as distant from Latinos as Latinos feel from blacks. About half of the blacks in the sample report having the most in common with Latinos (49.6 percent), while

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an almost similar proportion (45.5 percent) report having the most in common with whites. Just 22.7 percent of blacks report having the least in common with Latinos.<sup>22</sup>

To test our expectation that increases in length of time in the United States, and interaction with African Americans move Latino immigrants closer to blacks, we used a logit model with our dependent variable being a measure of which group, blacks or whites, Latino immigrants feel they have the most in common with. In this instance, we found including both contact measures simultaneously, social contact and blacks in the neighborhood, resulted in both being statistically insignificant, but since the number of blacks in the respondent's neighborhood was closer to significance than social contact, we decided to include it in our model. In addition to our primary independent variables, we also added a measure of the extent to which our Latino immigrant respondents hold stereotypical views of African Americans. We used the dependent variable of the stereotype index as a predictor in this analysis. The Latino linked fate variable is also included as a predictor.

[Table 3 about here]

Our results for this hypothesis are shown in Table 3. Our analyses do not reveal a statistically significant relationship between *educational attainment* and *length of time in the United States* with closeness to a particular racial group. The coefficients, however, on both variables are in the predicted direction, thus suggesting the relationship that we hypothesized, but not statistically significant. The coefficient on *the number of blacks in a respondent's neighborhood* seems to reveal a relationship that is opposite of what we hypothesized--the greater the number of blacks in the neighborhood, the more likely Latino immigrants are to feel

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<sup>22</sup>Given their small numbers in the Durham area (and nationally), it is interesting to note that between 30 and 40 percent of all races reported having the least in common and 32 percent of whites reported themselves as having the most in common with Asians.

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they have more in common with whites-- but it is also statistically insignificant.<sup>23</sup> The most statistically significant variables in our analysis are the *stereotype index* and *linked fate*, with the results revealing that those Latino immigrants with linked fate and with less stereotypical views of black Americans are more likely to feel they have the most in common with blacks, and least likely to believe they have the most in common with whites. Once again, a sense of group identity among Latino immigrants contributes significantly to a sense of connection with black Americans.

We compute percentage changes in probability as we move from one value on our independent variables to another. Substantively, therefore, an average Latino immigrant (i.e., with the mean levels of education, length of time in the United States, neighborhood interaction with African Americans, and perception of African Americans on the stereotype index) with linked fate is approximately 19 percent more likely than an average Latino without linked fate to feel that she has the most in common with African Americans. Though the relationship between perceptions of African Americans on the stereotype index and closeness to whites or blacks is statistically significant, the substantive effect is minuscule. Latino immigrants with highly stereotypical views of black Americans are less than one percent (.22 percent) more likely than other Latino immigrants to feel they have the most in common with whites.<sup>24</sup>

### **Discussion and Conclusion**

We posited two hypotheses--Latino immigrants hold negative stereotypes of blacks and Latino immigrants feel they have the most in common with whites, both attitudes that may be

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<sup>23</sup> As with the first hypothesis, we included interaction terms of linked fate with neighborhood contact with blacks, and education with neighborhood contact with blacks, individually and in combination. None of the interaction terms was statistically significant.

<sup>24</sup> For blacks, none of the predictors are statistically significant. (Results are not shown.) Moreover, the direction of the coefficients is opposite what we might have hypothesized.

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mitigated by contact factors and length of time in country--as the core questions for this paper.

Some aspects of our hypotheses have been confirmed and other portions have not panned out.

What we see is that contact theory and racial distancing are not mutually exclusive.

For the most part, Latino immigrants in Durham hold negative stereotypical views of blacks, with Latino males holding more stereotypical views of black Americans than do Latinas.

The presence of negative stereotypes of black Americans among Latino immigrants is consistent with the findings of Mindialo, Niemann and Rodriquez (2003). This is a troubling finding that raises additional questions. Given that length of stay in the United States appears to be unrelated to the strength of negative stereotypes about blacks, this finding suggests that Latino immigrants might possibly bring views of the racial hierarchies in their own countries with them to the United States. Since the research on race and Latin America and Mexico identifies blacks as representing the bottom rungs of society and the presence of the process of "whitening up," we assume that they might bring prejudicial attitudes with them.

On the other hand, several factors do appear to reduce Latino immigrants' negative stereotypes of black Americans--increases in education, a sense of linked fate on the part of Latino immigrants with other Latinos, and more social interaction with blacks. In this instance, contact theory, as defined as social contact, seems to bring about a positive change in attitude. Moreover, the presence of linked fate mitigates negative attitudes. The significance of this predictor has not been studied to any significant extent in the Latino politics literature and clearly deserves additional study, something we plan to do as we continue our work on this project.

In addition to holding negative stereotypical views of black Americans, Latino immigrants do indeed feel that they have more in common with whites than with blacks.

Moreover, living in the same neighborhoods as blacks, contrary to our expectations, appears to

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reinforce the view on the part of Latino immigrants that they have more in common with whites and the least in common with blacks. Thus, while social contact in the previous hypothesis reduces negative stereotypical views, Latino immigrants living in the same neighborhoods with blacks pushes them farther away from blacks and closer to whites. In this instance, contact theory does not appear to work when the contact comes about by living in the same neighborhood. If, as some scholars suggest, the longer some Latino immigrants remain in the United States, the more likely they are to begin to see themselves as “collective blacks,” then our results suggests that this is not necessarily the case, at least for the Latino immigrants in our Southern location (Bonilla-Silva 2004). While our statistical analyses shows that Latinos’ negative stereotypes of blacks and the likelihood that Latinos identify more with whites than with blacks decreases with length of stay in this country, the effects are statistically uncertain. It may be that with a considerably larger number of observations one might find a significant decline in attachments to whites, but the very small magnitude of these relationships does not provide this argument with much traction. Again, however, the presence of Latino immigrant linked fate moves Latino immigrants closer to blacks and away from whites. This finding is consistent with Kaufmann’s (2003) findings on Latinos in general—Latinos who feel closer to other Latinos are more likely to feel closer to blacks.

Our findings on the dimension of negative stereotypes of black Americans held by Latino immigrants are not merely a confirmation of previous results, but represent a significant difference from previous findings. While our result may conform to that of Mindialo, Niemann and Rodriquez (2001), the context is different and the possible effects more profound. Mindialo et al. examined attitudes in Houston, Texas where Latino immigrants were integrating into an existing Latino American population with a long history in Texas in general and Houston in particular. Attitudes of Latino immigrants could possibly be moderated and ameliorated through

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interaction with native-born Latino American populations. This situation does not exist, however, in the South, where American Latino communities are not present to any great extent. Therefore, this means Latino immigrants have no reference point for black Americans other than their own attitudes, which might have been formed prior to their arrival in the United States, and which do not appear to dissipate with increased interaction with blacks. Yet, the finding that these negative attitudes are modulated by a sense of linked fate suggests possibilities for the formation of connections to black Americans in the absence of the presence of an extant American Latino community.

What's more, these findings are important because the South still contains the largest population of African Americans in the United States and is considered their “regional homeland.” Moreover, the South has suffered through some of the most politicized battles over race relations in recent history. No other section of the country has been as rigidly defined along the black-white racial divide as has the South. While we did not test directly V. O. Key’s assertions of over fifty years ago of the continued salience of race in the South, the black-white divide in the South is certain to shape the attitudes and incentives of Latinos in the region, and how these new Latino immigrants situate themselves vis-à-vis black Americans has profound implications for the social and political fabric of the South.

What do these findings mean for Southern politics and the politics of race? We must be cautious in drawing broad conclusions about the future politics of the South from a one-Southern city study with a small survey sample. Yet our findings are suggestive of possible patterns that might be exhibited in other parts of the South and implicative of future trends.

Latino immigrants’ negative views of black Americans, most likely brought with them from their home countries and reinforced, rather than reduced, by neighborhood interactions with blacks, suggests that these new Latino immigrants may behave in ways similar to the Chinese in

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Mississippi in the mid-nineteenth century, and the Cubans in Miami in the mid-twentieth century--identification with whites, distancing themselves from blacks, and feeling no responsibility to rectify the continuing inequalities of black Americans. Given the increasing number of Latino immigrants in the South and the possibility that over time their numbers might rival or even surpass black Americans in the region, if large portions of Latino immigrants maintain negative attitudes of black Americans, where will this leave blacks? Will blacks find that they must not only make demands on whites for continued progress, but also mount a fight on another front against Latinos? Or, will Latino immigrants begin to see themselves as closer to blacks the longer they reside in the United States as some scholars suggest? Clearly, in order to answer this question we need to do similar work in a series of Southern locations. But, based on our results in this paper, which are by no means definitive, but are highly suggestive, we fear the former rather than the latter is the future of the politics of race in the South.

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**Table 1. 1990 and 2000 Census Data for the City of Durham**

	<b>1990</b>	<b>2000</b>	<b>Change (+/-)</b>
<b>Total Population</b>	136,611	187,035	+
Whites	51.6% (70,513)	45.5% (85,126)	-
Blacks	45.7% (62,393)	43.8% (81,937)	-
American Indians	0.2% (358)	0.3% (575)	+
Asians	1.9% (2,676)	3.6% (6,815)	+
Latinos	1.3% (1,713)	8.6% (16,012)	+
Mexicans	30.8% (528)	64.2% (10,343)	+
Puerto Ricans	21.5% (369)	6.7% (696)	-
Cubans	8.8% (150)	14.7% (236)	+
Other Hispanics	38.9% (666)	29.6% (4,737)	-

**Table 2: OLS Regression Results Predicting the Extent to Which Latino Immigrants Hold Negative Stereotypes of Blacks**

Variable	Model
	<i>Main Effects</i>
Education	-.1033** (.0421)
Male	.7860** (.3789)
Linked Fate	-.7472* (.4225)
Amount of Social Contact with Blacks	-.4780** (.1959)
Number of Blacks in Neighborhood	.2294 (.1926)
Length of Time in the United States	-.0295 (.0269)
Constant	12.216***
N	130
F Statistic	4.46***
R-Squared	.1788

*Note:* The dependent variable, stereotypical views of blacks, ranges in value from 3 (holding the least stereotypical views of blacks) to 15 (holding the most stereotypical views of blacks). Standard error estimates are in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<.01 (two-tailed test)

\*\* p<.05 (two-tailed test)

\* p<.10 (two-tailed test)

**Table 3. Logit Results for Which Group Latino Respondents Report Having the Most in Common With**

Variables	Coefficients
Education	-.0735 (.0576)
Linked Fate	-2.005** (.8703)
Length of Time in the United States	-.0301 (.0393)
Number of Blacks in Neighborhood	.2897 (.2826)
Stereotypical Views of Blacks <i>(Higher values indicate holding more stereotypical views of blacks.)</i>	.2293* (.1269)
Constant	.9166
N	102
Chi-Squared	14.21**
Pseudo R2	.1407

*Note:* The dependent variable for this model is coded such that 1 indicates having the most in common with whites and 0 indicates having the most in common with blacks. Standard error estimates are in parentheses.

\*\*\* p<.01 (two-tailed test)

\*\* p<.05 (two-tailed test)

\* p<.10 (two-tailed test)